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Gowda: A Survey of Important Decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court: 1

IV. CORPORATE
A. Direct and Derivative Claims
In Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc. v. Deloitte &
Touche,' the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a debenture
holder's claims against an issuer's auditor were not derivative
claims that belonged to the issuer. The holder's claim was
related to an injury that was separate and distinct from 2 any
claims belonging to the issuer or other debenture holders.
This case arose from the purchase by appellant Northwest
Racquet Swim and Health Clubs, Inc. (Northwest) of $15 million
in subordinated debentures from the later insolvent Midwest
Federal Savings & Loan Association (Midwest).' Respondent
Deloitte & Touche (Touche) performed audit work for Midwest
for several years prior to the debenture transaction.4 "At the
trial court, Northwest alleged that Touche participated in a plan
with Midwest that resulted in material misstatements in Midwest's
1986 year-end audited financial statements, on which Northwest
relied in 5 deciding to make the debenture purchase from
Midwest."
The issue presented before the supreme court was whether
Northwest asserted any injury separate and distinct from the
injury to other debenture holders.6 The court stated that
Minnesota has long adhered to the general principle that an
individual shareholder may not assert a cause of action that

1.
2.
3.

535 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. 1995).
Id. at 619.
Id. at 613.

4. Id.
5. Id. Touche was involved as an auditor for Midwest and Green Tree Acceptance
("Green Tree"), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Midwest in the business of purchasing,
pooling, and servicing loans for mobile homes and recreational vehicles. Id. at 613.
Through Touche's recommendation, Midwest purchased the servicing rights and the
net finance income receivables (FIR) from Green Tree. However, the FIR did not
perform as expected, and resulted in a big loss for Midwest. This alleged miscalculation
of the FIR yield by Touche (which made Midwest appear to be in a better financial
position than it actually was) ultimately affected Northwest's decision regarding the
debenture purchase from Midwest. Id. at 613-15.
6. Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 617.
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belongs to the corporation.7 In such a case, redress must be
sought in a "derivative" action on behalf of the corporation
rather than in a direct action by the individual shareholder.'
To distinguish between a direct and a derivative claim, Minnesota courts consider whether the injury to the plaintiff is separate
and distinct from the injury to the other persons in a similar
situation as the plaintiff.9
The court examined a series of federal cases addressing
claims similar to those asserted by Northwest.10 The court
looked at In re Sunrise SecuritiesLitigation," University of Maryland
v. Peat Marwick Main & Co.,1 and Hayes v. Gross."

7.
Seitz v.
430, 46
8.

Id. (citing Singer v. Allied Factors, Inc., 216 Minn. 443, 13 N.W.2d 378 (1944);
Michel, 148 Minn. 474, 181 N.W. 106 (1921); Mealey v. Nickerson, 44 Minn.
N.W. 911 (1890)).
Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 617 (citing 12B

CHARLES R.P. KEATING &JIM PERKOWITZ-SOLHEIM, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5908 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1993)).

9. Northwest Racquet Swim &Health Clubs, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Seitz, 148
Minn. at 476, 181 N.W. at 106). In Seitz, the Minnesota Supreme Court considered a
stockholder's claim that a third party conspired with corporate officers to "freeze-out"
the stockholder from participation in the management of the corporation. The court
asserted that the "[p]laintiff was injured just as all other stockholders are injured when
the officers of a corporation waste or misapply its money." Northwest Racquet Swim &
Health Clubs, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 617. The court noted that "[i]f he has no individual
right of action against an officer for misappropriating the money of the corporation,
he has none against third persons who persuaded the officer to misappropriate it, and
this without regard to the motives which actuated such third persons." Id.
10. Id. at 618-19.
11. 916 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1990). In Sunrise Securities Litigation, a group of
depositors sought to assert individual Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against the directors, officers, auditors, and outside counsel of
an insolvent savings and loan association. The depositors claims arose out of the
defendants' alleged misrepresentations of the true financial condition of the institution.
Id. at 875, 882. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the plaintiffs'
claims were derivative and could not be brought individually, despite the plaintiffs'
characterization of their claims. Their damages could not be separated from the injury
sustained by the institution and by depositors generally. Id. at 887-89.
12. 923 F.2d 265 (3d Cir. 1991). In the Third Circuit decision of University of
Maryland, policyholders of an insolvent insurance company sued the company's
independent auditor for damages arising from the auditor's alleged false and
misleading certification of the company's financial statements. The plaintiffs alleged
that these financial statements induced them into remaining as policyholders with the
company. Id. at 267. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims constituted a direct
rather than a derivative injury, distinguishing the case before it from In re Sunrise
SecuritiesLitigation, where the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' misconduct caused
the failure of the S & L, an injury common to all depositors. However, in the case
before it, the court found that plaintiffs' claim was based on inducement by the
misleading financial statements, an injury unique to the plaintiffs. Id. at 274.
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The court held that Northwest's claims were distinguishable
from the plaintiff's claims in Sunrise Securities Litigation and were
analogous to the plaintiff's claims in University of Maryland and
Hayes. 4 In re Sunrise Securities Litigation, the Third Circuit held
that although the plaintiffs claimed misrepresentation, the
foundation of these claims was the mismanagement and
insolvency of the institution.15 However, in the case before it,
the Minnesota Supreme Court reasoned that although Northwest
asserted that Touche's misrepresentation to Midwest indirectly
affected Northwest, Northwest also alleged specific incidences of
misrepresentation in Touche's audit report, upon which
Northwest directly relied in purchasing the debentures.16 The
court reasoned it was that claim of direct fraud and the resulting
injury that was separate and distinct from any fraud claim
belonging to Midwest and from any injury to the debenture
holders generally. 7 Therefore, the court held that Northwest's
18
claims were not derivative claims belonging to Midwest.
B. Securities Decision
In Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund v. Allison-Williams
Co., 9 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a company that
purchased high-yield, high-risk bonds for its pension plan from
a broker did not have a general unsuitability claim under the
Minnesota Securities Act."° The transactions were consistent
with the fund's investment objectives and financial situation, no
evidence existed that the broker acted with fraudulent intent or

13. 982 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1992). In Hayes, the plaintiff alleged that the directors
and officers of an insolvent savings association misrepresented the financial condition
of the association, causing the plaintiff to purchase the association's stock at an inflated
price. Id. at 105. On appeal, the Third Circuit concluded that the complaint did allege
a direct injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 106. The court noted that had the plaintiff alleged
only mismanagement by the defendants, the plaintiff's claim would be derivative.
However, the plaintiffs additional allegation that defendants made affirmative
representations regarding the condition of the association constituted an actionable
claim of direct injury to the plaintiff. Id.
14. Northwest Racquet Swim & Health Clubs, Inc., 535 N.W.2d at 619.
15. Id. at 619.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. 519 N.W.2d 176 (Minn. 1994).
20. MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-.31 (1994).
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exercised control over the pension fund's account.2 The court
also held that the broker did not violate the regulation"
imposing a duty to obtain information concerning a customer's
financial situation and other security holdings because the
securities purchased were not "low-priced" as required by the
regulation. 3
The issue presented was whether the district court properly
granted summary judgment to appellants Allison-Williams and
Robert Tengdin on claims by respondent Minneapolis Employees
Retirement Fund (MERF) that appellants violated the Minnesota
Securities Act and were negligent in connection with the sale of
securities to MERF. 24
MERF was a pension fund for retired employees of Minneapolis and for current employees hired before 1978.25 As of
1990, MERF had an investment portfolio in excess of $800
million.2 6 Allison-Williams was a licensed securities brokerdealer engaged in the purchase and sale of securities in the
secondary market for private placement.2 7 From 1981 until
1990, MERF purchased tens of millions of dollars of high-yield,
28
high-risk bonds from Allison-Williams.
From 1979 until May 1990, John Chenoweth was the
Executive Director of MERF.29 Robert Tengdin, the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Allison-Williams, represented the
company in the transactions with MERF. 30
Tengdin and
Chenoweth had extensive discussions in which Chenoweth
described MERF's investment objectives. 3' Allison-Williams did
not exercise discretion over MERF's investments and had no
authority to enter into transactions on MERF's behalf without
MERF's express authorization. 2 Chenoweth expressly approved
21. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund, 519 N.W.2d at 179-81.
22. Id. at 180 (citing Minnesota Rule 2875.0910, subpart 2 (1991)).
23. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund,519 N.W.2d at 181.
24. Id. at 178.
25. Id.
26. Id. Chenoweth had primary responsibility for MERF's in-house bond portfolio
and had authority to engage in securities transactions for MERF. Id.
27. Id. at 178. Allison-Williams dealt only with institutional investors such as MERF.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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in advance the purchase of every security sold to MERF by
Allison-Williams.
MERF did not disclose to Allison-Williams
any other investments it purchased from other brokers.3 4
In June 1991, MERF sued Allison-Williams for losses
incurred as a result of transactions with Allison-Williams.35
MERF alleged that Allison-Williams breached a fiduciary duty to
MERF, was negligent, and violated the Minnesota Securities
Act 6 by selling unsuitable investments and failing to disclose
material facts to MERF. 7 MERF's unsuitability claim was based
on (1) a violation of the Minnesota Securities Act and (2) a
breach of duty to obtain information concerning MERF's
financial situation before recommending the sale of speculative
securities under Minnesota Rules part 2875.0910, subpart 2.3"
In determining whether Allison-Williams violated the
Minnesota Securities Act, the court looked at federal case law
because the Act "is patterned after federal law."39 The court
noted that federal courts have recognized that a broker-dealer
may be liable where the dealer recommends the purchase of
securities unsuitable for the buyer's investment needs.'
In a
41
Tenth Circuit decision, O'Connor v. RE Lafferty & Co., the
court held that to establish an unsuitability claim based on fraud,
a plaintiff must prove three elements: (1) that a broker-dealer
recommended or purchased securities that were unsuitable in
light of the investor's objectives; (2) that a broker-dealer
recommended or purchased securities with an intent to defraud
or with reckless disregard of the investor's interests; and (3) that
42
the broker exercised control over the investor's account.
The Minnesota Supreme Court applied the O'Connor

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 179.
36. MINN. STAT. §§ 80A.01-.31 (1994).
37. MinneapolisEmployees Retirement Fund 519 N.W.2d at 179. The district court
granted Allison-Williams's motion for summaryjudgment on all three claims. The court
of appeals affirmed summary judgment on MERF's breach of fiduciary duty claim, but
reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment on MERF's unsuitability claim.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. The court stated that Minnesota Statutes § 80A.01 is Minnesota's
counterpart to Federal Rule lOb-5. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1995).
40. MinneapolisEmployees Retirement Fund 519 N.W.2d at 179.
41. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
42. Id.
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standard in determining MERF's securities fraud claim.'
Regarding the first element of the O'Connortest, the court held
that MERF's transactions with Allison-Williams were consistent
with MERF's objectives and financial situation as disclosed by
MERF." The court reasoned that the purchase of high-yield
speculative bonds by an institutional investor is a common
transaction and that Chenoweth had indicated to Tengdin that
he was interested in obtaining greater returns by buying privately
placed securities. 5
Under the second element of the O'Connor test, the court
held that MERF failed to produce substantial evidence showing
fraudulent intent or reckless disregard on the part of AllisonWilliams.' The court reasoned that Chenoweth was authorized
to communicate MERF's investment objectives and that no
evidence existed that Allison-Williams recommended a security
inconsistent with MERF's objectives.4"
The court held with regard to the third element of the
O'Connor test that MERF failed to present substantial evidence
that Allison-Williams exercised control over MERF's account. 4
The court reasoned that Allison-Williams had no authority to
enter into transactions on MERF's behalf without its advance,
Moreover, Chenoweth expressly
express authorization.4 9
approved in advance the purchase of all securities sold to MERF
Thus, no unsuitability claim existed
by Allison-Williams."
under the Minnesota Securities Act.
The court examined the unsuitability claim under Minnesota Rule part 2875.0910, subpart 2 (1991), which provides that a
broker-dealer may have a duty to obtain information concerning
a customer's financial situation and other security holdings
where the broker-dealer recommends "speculative, low-priced"

43. MinneapolisEmployees Retirement Fund, 519 N.W.2d at 180.
44. Id.
45.

Id.

46. Id. at 180-81.
47. Id. The court rejected MERF's argument that a showing of fraudulent intent
or recklessness should not be required for unsuitability claims under the Minnesota
Securities Act. The court stated, "[w]e are unaware of any court decision under federal
or state securities law which has ever recognized an unsuitability claim without requiring
a showing of fraudulent intent or recklessness." Id. at 181.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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securities." The court held that although it is undisputed that
the private placement securities sold by Allison-Williams were
speculative in nature, the securities were certainly not "lowpriced."52 The court concluded that a "low-priced" security is
one that is low in market value.

3

The court reasoned that no

liability existed under Minnesota Rules part 2875.0910, subpart
2. because MERF was a sophisticated institutional investor who
purchased securities ranging in price from hundreds of thousands to millions of dollars. 4
Lastly, the court determined that MERF had no negligence
claim against Allison-Williams. 5 The court held that a broker

is not a guarantor or insurer against losses sustained by her
customer.56 Thus, absent a special agreement to the contrary,
a broker owes her customer only the duty to exercise due care

in executing all instructions expressly given to her.5 7 The court
maintained

that the Minnesota Securities Act regulations

prohibiting recommendation

of unsuitable

securities and

prohibiting charging of excessive markups did not create a new
standard of care for brokers.5 ' Thus, the court held that the

district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of
Allison-Williams.

9

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The court stated that Minnesota Rule 2875.0910, subpart 2 was not
intended to apply to sophisticated institutional investors like MERF, which had an
investment portfolio at one point in excess of $800 million. The court maintained that
it is unlikely that an institutional investor would provide information regarding all of
its security holdings to a broker-dealer. Therefore, to apply Minnesota Rule 2875.0910,
subpart 2 to institutional investors would open the door to lawsuits by such investors
against brokers every time the investor lost money on the basis that the brokers failed
to acquire sufficient information about the investor. Id. at 182.
55. Id.
56. Id. (citing Rude v. Larson, 296 Minn. 518, 519-20, 207 N.W.2d 709, 711
(1973)). The court stated that a person practicing a profession is bound to exercise the
degree of care and skill usually exercised by members of the profession under similar
circumstances. Minneapolis Employees Retirement Fund, 519 N.W.2d at 182 (citing City of
Eveleth v. Ruble, 302 Minn. 249, 253, 225 N.W.2d 521, 525 (1974)).
57. MinneapolisEmployees Retirement Fund, 519 N.W.2d at 182.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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C. Minnesota FranchiseAct
In Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enterprises, Inc.,'
the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a buyer's payment
under a computer software sales agreement was for both the
seller's software program and also for the buyer's right to enter
into the business of becoming a "reseller" of the seller's software
and hardware products. Thus, the payment was a "franchise
fee"6 1 under the Minnesota Franchise Act (Act).62 The court
also held the exception to the Act, 63 where a "franchisee is
required to pay less than $100 on an annual basis," was intended
to apply to "direct sales" to consumers and not to an agreement
under which the franchisee was to resell computer hardware and
software products.'
The issue presented in the case was whether an agreement
between Irie Enterprises, Inc. (Irie), a Michigan corporation, and
Current Technology Concepts, Inc. (CTC), a Minnesota
corporation, constituted a franchise governed by the Act.65
According to an agreement (CA$H Agreement) dated June
22, 1989, CTC purchased from Irie a computer software program
for $125,000.6
As part of the consideration for the CA$H
Agreement, Irie agreed to enter into a separate agreement
(Reseller Agreement) with CTC that allowed CTC to resell Irie's
other software and hardware products.6 7 On December 23,
1990, the two companies renewed their Reseller Agreement for

60. 530 N.W.2d 539 (Minn. 1995).
61. Id. at 542.
62. MINN. STAT. § 80C.01-.30 (1994).
63. MINN. STAT. §80C.01, subd. 4(f) (1994).
64. Current Technology Concepts, Inc. v. Irie Enters., Inc., 530 N.W.2d 539 (Minn.
1995). Current Technology Concepts, Inc. (CTC) originally filed suit in the U.S.
District Court, District of Minnesota, when Irie terminated an agreement between the
two corporations that gave CTC the right to market Irie's computer software and
hardware products. Id. at 540. "The Honorable Judge Donald Lay, presiding,
concluded as a matter of law that the Act applied to the agreement and that Irie
violated the Act." Id. "A jury trial was held on the issue of damages and the jury
returned a verdict of $1.3 million in CTC's favor." Id. Judge Lay responded to Irie's
movement for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, or remittitur, by certif'ing
questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Id. at 540-41.
65.

66.
tracked
medical
67.

Id. at 540.

Id. at 541. This software program, which was designed for billing purposes,
and monitored the use and distribution of a hospital's durable, reusable
equipment. Id.
Id.
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thirty-six months.'
Irie later terminated this Renewal Agreement, justifying the action by stating that CTC's account was
delinquent. 69 CTC brought this lawsuit as a result of Irie's
termination notice.7 °
The first certified question was whether the $125,000
payment required by the CA$H Agreement was consideration for
the Reseller Agreement so as to constitute a franchise fee under
the Act. 71 Irie argued that paragraphs 6.1 and 8.072 of the
CA$H Agreement were in conflict, and therefore the agreement
was ambiguous as to whether the $125,000 constituted consideration for the Reseller Agreement in addition to the CA$H
System. 73 The court maintained that a contract is ambiguous if
its language is reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation.7 ' The court concluded that it did not find paragraphs
6.1 and 8.0 of the agreement in conflict and therefore the agreement was not ambiguous.7 5 The court stated that it is well
settled that one promise may act as consideration for multiple
promises. 76 The court reasoned that the $125,000 payment
from CTC was consideration for the promises contained in
paragraphs 6.1 and 8.0, as paragraph 6.1 did not indicate the
payment was exclusively for the CA$H System.77 Thus, the

68. Id.
69. Id. CTC believed that Irie terminated the Renewal Agreement to usurp from
CTC the market it had created for Irie's products. Id. at 542.
70. Id.
71. Id. "A 'franchise fee' means any fee or charge that a franchisee or
subfranchisor is required to pay or agrees to pay for the right to enter into a business
or to continue a business under a franchise agreement. . . ." MINN. STAT. § 80C.01,
subd. 9 (1994).
72. Current Technology Concepts, Inc., 530 N.W.2d at 542. Paragraph 8.0 of the CA$H
Agreement provided: "As part of the consideration for this Agreement, Irie agrees to
enter into a Reseller Agreement with CTC allowing CTC to resell other software and
hardware products of IRIE." Id. Paragraph 6.1 provided that "CTC shall pay IRIE for
ownership of the CA$H System a sum not to exceed one hundred twenty-five thousand
dollars ($125,000)." Id. at n.7.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Metro Office Parks Co. v. Control Data Corp., 295 Minn. 348, 351,
205 N.W.2d 121, 123 (1973); Lamb Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Kraus-Anderson of
Minneapolis, Inc., 296 N.W.2d 859, 862 (Minn. 1980)).
75. Current Technology Concepts, Inc., 530 N.W.2d at 543.
76. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 80 cmt. a (1981)).
77. Current Technology Concepts, Inc., 530 N.W.2d at 541-42. The court further
reasoned that to read exclusivity into paragraph 6.1 would leave paragraph 8.0 without
meaning, violating the rule that contracts are to be interpreted to give every provision
meaning. Id. at 543.
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court concluded that the $125,000 payment for the CA$H
System served as consideration for the Reseller Agreement and
constituted a "fee ... that a franchise... agrees to pay for the
right to enter into a business."78
The second certified question was whether the parties'
Reseller and Renewal Agreements are excluded from the Act's
coverage because of the exception to coverage under Minnesota
Statutes section 80C.01, subdivision 4(f).79 Subdivision 4(f)
provides that a "' [f] ranchise' does not include any contract, lease
or other agreement whereby the franchisee is required to pay
less than $100 on an annual basis."8 ° The court found the
statute to be ambiguous."1 The court stated that when the
language of a statute is ambiguous, the rules of statutory
construction, which allow the examination of legislative history
should be applied. 2
Legislative history indicated that subdivision 4(f) "excludes
certain direct sales which were not contemplated by" the Act. 3
The court maintained that the term "direct sale" generally
involves the concept of selling products directly from the
manufacturer to the ultimate consumer without intervening
middlemen. 84 The court concluded that based on the legislative history and the court's understanding of "direct sale," the
exception to the Act under subdivision 4(f) was not intended to
apply to the Reseller and Renewal Agreements because the
agreements did not contemplate Irie engaging in a direct sale of
its products to ultimate users.85 Therefore, the court held the
agreements between the two companies were not excluded from
the Act's coverage by Minnesota Statutes section 80C.01,
subdivision 4(f).86
Preethi Gowda

78. Id. at 543.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1994)).
83. Current Technology Concepts, Inc., 530 N.W.2d at 544 (quoting legislative
testimony of Mary Brophy, Commissioner of the Securities and Real Estate Division of
the Commerce Department).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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